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Abstract
This paper develops a ﬁnite mixture distribution analysis of Beauty-
Contest data obtained from diverse groups of experiments. ML estimation
using the EM approach provides estimates for the means and variances of
the component distributions, which are common to all the groups, and es-
timates of the mixing proportions, which are speciﬁc to each group. This
estimation is performed without imposing constraints on the parameters of
the composing distributions. The statistical analysis indicates that many
individuals follow a common pattern of reasoning described as iterated best
reply (degenerate), and shows that the proportions of people thinking at dif-
ferent levels of depth vary across groups.
Keywords: Beauty-Contest experiments, reasoning hierarchy, ﬁnite mixture
distribution, EM algorithm.
01 Introduction
In recent years there has been an increasing interest in evaluating experi-
mentally individuals’ choices, decision processes and beliefs formation. From
an econometric perspective, the potential multiplicity of decisions and be-
liefs favors clustering procedures to separate the diﬀerent outcomes of each
decision process. These procedures diﬀer in the estimation techniques used
and the amount of structure imposed on the econometric model.
In this paper we seek to interpret the choice data reported in A. Bosch-
Dom` enech, J. G. Montalvo, R. Nagel and A. Satorra (2002), by constructing a
ﬁnite mixture model. These data were obtained in seventeen diﬀerent exper-
iments involving the Beauty-Contest (BC) game. In a basic BC game, each
player simultaneously chooses a decimal number in an interval. The winner
is the person whose number is closest to p times the mean of all chosen num-
bers, where p<1 is a predetermined and known number. The winner gains
a ﬁxed prize. In this game there exists only one (Nash) equilibrium in which
all players choose the lowest possible number. In the seventeen experiments
reported, p =2 /3 and the interval, in sixteen out of the seventeen, is [0,100].
In one experiment the choice set is [1,100].
Several types of reasoning processes have been proposed to explain the
individuals’ decisions in the BC game (see references in Section 5). One such
reasoning process, denoted as IBRd, for Iterated Best Reply with degenerate
beliefs (i.e., the belief that the choices of all others are at, or around, one
precise value),1 classiﬁes subjects according to the depth, or number of levels,
1See, e.g., Bosch-Dom` enech et al. (2002) or Stahl (1996).
1of their reasoning. It assumes that, at each level, every player has the belief
that she is exactly one level of reasoning deeper than all the rest. A Level-0
player chooses randomly in the given interval [0,100], with the mean being
50. Therefore, a Level-1 player gives best reply to the belief that everybody
else is a Level-0 player and thus chooses 50p. A Level-2 player chooses 50p2,
a Level-k player chooses 50pk, and so on. A player who takes inﬁnite steps of
reasoning, and believes that all players take inﬁnite steps, chooses zero, the
equilibrium. This hypothesis of iterated best reply, together with p =2 /3,
a n da ni n t e r v a l[ 0 ,100], predicts that choices (in addition to random and
haphazard choices, corresponding to Level-0 players) will be on the values
33.33, 22.22, 14.81, 9.88, ...and, in the limit, 0.
The seventeen diﬀerent experiments whose data we are analyzing take
place in diﬀerents settings, and are classiﬁed in six groups as described in
Table 1.2
————– Table 1 about here ————-
Note that the experiments are performed in very diﬀerent environments,
involving diﬀerent subject pools, sample sizes, payoﬀs, and settings: the data
have been collected in classrooms, conferences, by e-mail, through news-
groups or among newspaper readers, as well as in laboratories with under-
graduate students. The non-laboratory sessions typically allow more time
to participants and use economists, game theorists, or the general public as
subjects. We are, therefore, dealing with a rich and heterogeneous data set.
2More details of these seventeen experiments and the IBRd hypothesis can be found in
Bosch-Dom` enech et al. (2002).
2This paper presents a statistical analysis of these BC data allowing for
two types of heterogeneity: one that is unobserved, namely the reasoning
level of each individuals in the sample; and another one that is manifest, the
group membership. We specify a ﬁnite mixture distribution model, with all
parameters of the composing distributions unconstrained (to be estimated)
but equal across groups, and with mixture proportions that are group spe-
ciﬁc. This approach contrasts with the previous literature on BC, where data
sets were more homogeneous, and the models more restrictive. By ﬁtting a
multi-sample mixture model with composing distributions of diﬀerent types
(one uniform distribution, and several censored and truncated normal dis-
tributions), it also departs from the standard applications of ﬁnite mixture
models.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data
and the characteristics of each group of experiments. Section 3 proposes a
ﬁnite mixture distribution model to interpret the unobserved heterogeneity
associated with the reasoning processes of agents playing the BC game. Sec-
tion 4 contains estimation results that give empirical support to the IBRd
hypothesis. Section 5 compares our results with those using alternative sta-
tistical procedures applied to BC data. Section 6 concludes.
2D a t a d e s c r i p t i o n
Inspecting the histogram for the whole distribution, when all the groups are
pooled together (see Figure 1), we observe that the peaks closely correspond
to the numbers that individuals would have chosen if they had reasoned
according to the IBRd hypothesis, at reasoning levels one, two, three and
3inﬁnity. If we take the histograms for the six groups of data separately
(Figure 2), the peaks at level one, two and inﬁnity are still discernible, but
their frequency varies considerably across groups of experiments.
————– Figure 1 about here ————-
————– Figure 2 about here ————-
The ﬁrst group, Lab-experiments with undergraduates, is clearly distin-
guished from the rest, because the Nash equilibrium was rarely selected.
When subjects have some training in game theory, the proportion of sub-
jects choosing the equilibrium seems to increase. The highest frequencies
are attained when experimenting with theorists, in which case, the greater
conﬁdence that others will reach similar conclusions may be reinforcing the
eﬀect of training. In Newspapers, the frequency of equilibrium choices falls
somewhere in between,3 as should be expected from the heterogeneous level
of training of their readers.
Yet, for some subgroups of data in particular, the regularity of choices
can be striking. Take the responses from readers of Financial Times (FT)
and Spektrum (S). Despite catering to diﬀerent types of readers (S to scien-
tists and FT to businessmen) and the severe non-normality of the data, a
comparison of the results of the experiment performed with S and FT readers
yields a very similar distribution, as can be observed in the quantile-quantile
plot of Figure 3.4 The Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared test statistic for the null
3In Expansi´ on the choices were in [1,100]. If we include choices at 1 as equilibrium
choices, then the frequency would increase.
4In this type of graphs, equality of distributions corresponds to points lying on the
diagonal.
4hypothesis that the two distributions are the same is equal to 0.002 (p-value
equal to 0.964), i.e., the two distributions cannot be distinguished.
————– Figure 3 about here ————-
3 The ﬁnite mixture model and estimation
procedure
From our previous discussion it appears that the basic problem in ﬁtting a
statistical model to the BC data we consider is the existence of unobserved
heterogeneity (the diﬀerent levels of reasoning), in addition to a multiple
group structure. Statisticians and, more recently, economists, have devel-
oped models of ﬁnite mixture distributions to deal with this type of prob-
lems.5 This section proposes an interpretation of the BC data as a mixture
of distributions and provides a statistical strategy to estimate such a model.
3.1 A multi-sample ﬁnite mixture model
Let us denote the multiple-sample data in Table 1 by {yig; i =1 ,...,n g}
6
g=1,
where yig is the number chosen by individual i in the group g of experiments,
and ng is the sample size of group g.
For each of the six diﬀerent groups, we specify the following (K +1 ) -
mixture probability density function for y,
fy(y,ψ)=π0f0(y)+π1f1(y,θ1)+...π KfK(y,θK),
where the f0,f 1,...,f K are the components of the mixture distribution, θk
denoting a mean and variance parameter vector of component k,a n d
5Titterington et al.(1992) covers many issues related to the statistical properties of
ﬁnite mixture distributions models.
5• f0(y)=1 /100, i.e., the density of the uniform distribution in [0,100].
• fk,k =1 ,...,K− 1, are (truncated below 0 and above 100) normal
distributions of means µk and variances σ2
k.
• fK is a Normal distribution, of mean µK and variance σ2
K, left-censored
at the value 1. The censoring of this distribution models the non-null
mass probability at the left-limit value of the distribution, at values 0
and 1. Recall that in one experiment the limit value was at 1, not 0.
For the sake of parsimony we consider a single left-censored distribution
at 1 (which, obviously, automatically collects the censoring at 0).
• the πi’s are mixing proportions,w i t hπi > 0a n d
K
0 πi =1 . T h i s
mixing proportions are the weights of the diﬀerent components of the
mixture.
We deﬁne the parameter vector ψ =( π,θ) ,w h e r eπ =( π0,π 1,...,π K)i s
the vector of mixing proportions and θ =( µ1,...,µ K,σ 2
1,...,σ 2
K) is the vec-
tor of parameters of the normal distributions underlying the mixture model.
The model we adopt for estimation sets π to be group-speciﬁc, but imposes
the equality of θ across groups. It is reasonable to assume that there is a com-
mon pattern of reasoning accross groups of individuals playing the BC-game,
therefore we let means and variances to be equal across groups. However, the
proportion of players at each level of reasoning may be diﬀerent accross ex-
periments. This strategy allows also to obtain sensible estimates for complex
mixture distributions even in the groups with small sample size.
63.2 ML estimation and the EM algorithm
From the ﬁnite mixture model described above, the log-likelihood function
of θ is
l(θ)=

i
log
 K 
k=0
πkfk(yi ;θ)

,
where i varies across all sample units. Since this log-likelihood function in-
volves the log of a sum of terms that are (highly non-linear) functions of
parameters and data, its maximization using standard optimization routines
is not feasible in general; for this maximization, we will resort on the EM
algorithm (Dempster, Laird and Rubin 1977). 6 We consider the data aug-
mented with variables di =( di1,...,d iK) ,w h e r edik are dummy variables
identifying the component membership (i.e., for each i, dik = 0, except for
one particular k,w h e ndik = 1). Obviously, the di’s are non-observable. As-
suming that di has a multinomial distribution with parameters (π0,...,π K) ,
the log-likelihood of the complete data is:
lC(θ)=
n 
i
K 
i=0
dik (logπk +l o g fk(yi;θk))
The EM approach computes ML estimates using the following algorithm.
1. For given values of ˆ πik and ˆ πk, maximize with respect to θ the function
n
i
K
i=0 ˆ πik (logˆ πk +l o g fk(yi;θk))
2. For given θ,u p d a t et h eˆ πik (estimated conditional probabilities of case
6Recently Arcidiacono and Jones (2003) have proposed an extension of the EM algo-
rithm where the parameters of the ﬁnite mixture distribution can be estimated sequentially
during each maximization step. In our case, however, we did not ﬁnd necessary to resort
to this alternative. See also McLachalan and Peel (2000) for diﬀerent extensions and
applications of the EM algorithm.
7i belonging to k)a n dt h eˆ πik (marginal probabilities) using the formula
ˆ πik =
πkfk(yi;θk)
K
k=1 πkfk(yi;θk)
and ˆ πk =
1
n
n 
i
ˆ πik (1)
Starting from initial estimates ˆ πik’s and ˆ πk, the EM algorithm consists in
iterating 1) and 2) till convergence.
The optimization in 1) implies the maximization of a (K+1) group model
with weighted data. That is, we maximize
n 
i
K 
k=1
ˆ πiklogfk(yi;θk)=
K 
k=1
 n 
i
ˆ πiklogfk(yi;θk)

.
Note, however, that our model imposes equality across groups (the six
groups of experiments) of the parameters that deﬁne the normal distributions
of the mixture, while it allows for group speciﬁc mixing proportions, πikg,
g =1 ,...,6. This implies the substitution of (1) by
ˆ πikg =
πkgfk(yi;θk)
K
1 πkfk(yi;θk)
and ˆ πkg =
1
ng
ng 
i
ˆ πikg,g =1 ,...,6. (2)
In terms of Bayes theorem, ˆ πikg is the posterior probability of case i of group
g to be in component k, k =0 ,1,...,K. The posterior probabilities can be
used to assign each observation to a component, by applying the simple rule
that element i is assigned to component k if ˆ πik > ˆ πik for any k   = k.N o t e
that in our approach, the posterior probabilities of belonging to component
k change with the group g.
Information statistics can be computed using the general expression
C = −2logL + qM,
where L is the likelihood of the data, M is some constant and q is the num-
ber of parameters to be estimated. The preferred model is the one with
8the smallest information criterium C, so the term qM is a penalty for over-
parametrization of the model. In the present paper we set M =2 ,w h i c h
implies the use of the Akaike’s information criterium (AIC) as the guide for
choosing of our preferred mixtures model (see, e.g., Bozdogan (1970)).
4 Results of the Analysis
Using AIC to assess the ﬁt of the model, we ﬁnd that the preferred model
includes ﬁve (truncated) normal distributions, in addition to the uniform
and the normal censored components. The actual values of the AIC for
the mixture models with four, ﬁve and six (truncated) normal distributions
(plus the uniform and one left-censored distributions) are equal, respectively,
to 6.7619, 6.7602 and 6.9022 (multiplied by 104), supporting the choice of
ﬁve (truncated) normal distributions. When in this model we suppress the
uniform component, then AIC jumps from 6.7602 to 6.7902 (both values
multiplied by 104), which represents a substantial deterioration in the ﬁt and
indicates the need for the uniform component.
Using initial parameter estimates based on sample statistics (sample quan-
tiles and variances), the EM algorithm achieves convergence after 775 itera-
tions. The evolution of (minus) the likelihood function during the iterations
process is shown in Figure 4.
————– Figure 4 about here ————-
Table 2 shows the estimates of the means and variances of the compos-
ing distributions, as well as the estimates of the mixing proportions across
9groups. Of the ﬁve components that correspond to the truncated normal dis-
tributions, three are uncannily centered at the values predicted by the IBRd
hypothesis (estimated: 33.35; 22.89; 14.98; theoretical: 33.33; 22.22; 14.81).
Note also that deviations around these means are moderate.
A fourth normal component is a very ﬂat distribution, centered at 35.9
with a large SD of 9.37. This we interpret as indicating that the uniform
distribution fails to capture all the Level-0 players. While the uniform dis-
tribution appears to take care of some random or haphazard choices be-
tween 0 and 100, the need for this normal component suggests that many of
these choices are biased towards the lower half of the interval.7 We conclude
that Level-0 decisions are better described by both the uniform and this ﬂat
normal distribution. This interpretation would suggest that the number of
Level-0 players is larger than previously thought.8
The ﬁfth normal is centered at 7.35, below the theoretical prediction for
Level-4 players. The interpretation for this normal distribution is not as
straightforward as for other distributions. It could be the distribution of
Level-4 choices, with a mean smaller than the theoretic value of 9.88. How-
ever, analyzing about 1000 comments submitted by participants in diﬀerent
BC experiments (see Bosch-Dom` enech et al. (2002)), we found that less than
1% reasoned at Level-4. Instead, participants reasoned either at most until
Level-3, or jumped all the way to Level-∞. Among the choices belonging to
subjects reaching Level-∞, only about 20% corresponded to the equilibrium
7Actually, in game-theoretical parlance, choices above 66.66 are dominated.
8Using BC data on a sample of undergraduate students Nagel (1995) and Ho et al.
(1998) calculate, respectively, a 13.1% and a 28.3% proportion of level-0 players. Using
our sample of undergraduates we obtain that the relative size of level-0 players is 57.05%.
10and 60% were in the interval between the equilibrium and 10. This leads us
to interpret this ﬁfth distribution as capturing the choices of Level-∞ players
rebounding from the equilibrium.
————– Table 2 about here ————-
Finally, the estimated mean and standard deviation of the censored dis-
tribution are respectively 0.59 and 1.91. This distribution also accounts for
choices of Level-∞ players. The proportion of censored observations in the
diﬀerent groups, both for the ﬁtted and empirical distributions, are shown
in Table 3. We observe that the proportion of censoring (i.e. the proportion
of choices at the limit of the interval of choices) varies across groups, with
the proportions being largest and smallest for the Theorist and Lab groups,
respectively.
————– Table 3 about here ————-
The components of the mixture distribution are depicted in Figure 5,
where we show the probability density function of the various composing
distributions, with the estimated mean values of the normal distributions
displayed in the x-axis of the graph.
————– Figure 5 about here ————-
Table 2 also shows the estimates of the mixing proportions for each group.
According to our interpretation, the ﬁrst two columns of results in Table 2,
11taken together, would indicate the frequency of random, haphazard and un-
explained choices. This proportion of Level-0 players range from about 25%
among theorists to as much as close to 60% among undergraduate students.
The number of Level-1 subjects tends to stay just below 10% in all groups,
while Level-2 and Level-3 vary from 15% to 20% in most groups. Finally,
Level-∞ participants appear in larger proportions among theorists, to as
much as 51%, they consist in a fairly important chunk of newspaper readers,
up to 30%, and in a small proportion of students in the lab, about 7%.
Combining the mixing proportions for each group, as they appear in Table
2, with the components of the mixture common to all the groups, as depicted
in Figure 5, we obtain the ﬁtted mixture distributions that are speciﬁc to
each group, as shown in Figure 6. These ﬁtted distributions correspond to
the group-speciﬁc empirical distributions of Figure 2 and help to perceive
the variation across groups of the proportions of individuals at the diﬀerent
levels of reasoning. It is remarkable that a unique set of components of the
mixture allows us to ﬁt the data from diﬀerent groups by simply changing
the mixing proportions across these groups.
————– Figure 6 about here ————-
An interesting feature is the increasing variance from Level-1 to Level-∞.
People who reach Level-1 choose very tightly around 33. Those reaching
Level-2 choose around 22, but not so tightly. The variance of the choice at
Level-3 is even larger and it is largest in the choices of Level-∞ individuals,
when we take the compound variance of the two distributions f5 and f6 of
12Table 2. 9
A plausible interpretation of this result is that as subjects take further
steps of reasoning they become more and more aware of the complexity of the
game, and assume that the rest of participants may make more and more
dispersed choices. In any case, subjects at Level-k must believe that the
dispersion of others’ choices is centered around the choice of Level-(k − 1)
players. Otherwise we would not see the sharp peaks we observe in the
empirical data. Curiously, the increasing dispersion indicates that subjects
at Level-k mistakenly believe that the dispersion of choices around Level-
(k − 1) choice is larger than what in fact is.
To conclude, it appears that the estimated location of the composing
distributions of the mixture gives empirical support to the IBRd hypothesis.
The analysis also shows that the proportions of subjects with diﬀerent levels
of reasoning vary across groups.
5 Comparison with the literature
The literature on the estimation of data generated by BC experiments is
quite diverse in its use of alternative statistical procedures. In her seminal
paper on the BC, Nagel (1995) separates agents in bins centered around the
theoretical values of the iterated best replies, 50pk,w h e r ek represents the
iteration level and p the predetemined number that, when multiplied by the
mean of all choosen numbers, yields the winning number. Stahl (1996) uses a
boundedly rational learning rule assuming that, in the ﬁrst period, the choice
9This is in contrast with Ho et al. (1998) and Stahl (1996), where variances were
constrained to follow a decreasing pattern.
13in each level k is distributed according to a truncated normal distribution
with means speciﬁed (not estimated) at 50pk, and all variances following a
decreasing rule. Ho, Weigelt and Camerer (1998) specify a model in which
the mean and variance of Level-k choices are functions of the mean and
variance of choices at the previous level, so that the only parameters of the
model are the mean and variance of Level-0 choices. This highly restricted
model is then estimated by maximum likelihood.
These papers share many common features. The empirical models have
as fundamental elements the decision rules used by subjects, the calculation
errors or noise, and the beliefs about other players’ strategies or types. Al-
though some models take explicit account of errors in the individuals’ choices
(see El-Gamar and Grether (1995), or Haruvy, Stahl and Wilson (2000)),
with BC data, the hypothesis of best response to type Level-(k − 1) players
on the part of Level-k subjects provides a hierarchical model that becomes
the basic tool to describe the set of decision rules.
Recently Camerer, Ho and Chong (2003) proposed a non-degenerated
distribution of beliefs about other players choices. They assume that subjects
believe that no other player uses as many levels of reasoning as themselves and
assume also that players guess the relative proportion of other players at the
diﬀerent (lower) levels of reasoning. Since the number of levels of reasoning
is an integer, Camerer, et al. (2003) argue that the Poisson distribution is a
reasonable parametric distribution of other players reasoning levels. While
this model ﬁts well samples of data from diﬀerent games, it cannot account
for the multi-peaked distribution of choices typical of BC games.
In our empirical model we also assume that individuals share a common
14pattern of reasoning independently of the particular set-up of the BC ex-
periment. Our choice of distribution functions is guided by the nature of
the data: truncated distributions between 0 and 100, since the choice set is
constrained by these numbers, and a censored distribution to deal with the
fact that there is non-null mass probability at values 0 or 1. The uniform
distribution seems appropriate to take care of random choices.
All parameters of these distributions are estimated, and the number of
distributions is not determined in advance. This approach is in contrast
with the previous analysis just mentioned, where means and variances of a
predetermined number of distributions are constrained to follow a particular
sequence.
6 Conclusions
This paper provides a mixture distribution analysis of data obtained from
experiments on the BC game, with diverse samples of subjects. The analysis
is based on a model of censored and truncated normal distributions plus a
uniform distribution, but does not impose any further structure on the model
speciﬁcation. The means and variances of the composing distributions of the
mixture are let free, to be estimated, and so are the proportions of subjects
at diﬀerent levels of reasoning. Even the number of distributions involved is
not predetermined. This is in contrast with previous statistical analysis of
BC data.
A feature of our analysis is the assumption that individuals playing the
BC game share a common pattern of reasoning, independently of the speciﬁc
set-up of the experiment. However, we allow for variations across groups of
15experiments in the proportion of players using diﬀerent depths of reasoning.
In statistical terms this implies a unique speciﬁc composition of mixtures
across groups of experiments, with the mixing proportions of the components
varying across groups. It is remarkable how much variation can be accounted
for by a change in the mixing proportions. This set-up also permits the ﬁtting
of a complex mixture model to groups with relatively small sample sizes.
We apply this mixture distribution model to data gathered from experi-
ments with newspapers readers, involving thousands of subjects in diﬀerent
countries, as well as from experiments run in labs with subject pools of un-
dergraduate students, graduate students and economists. We estimate the
mean and variance of each composing distribution, as well as the mixing pro-
portions for each group of experiments. In view of the estimated locations
of the composing distributions, our results support the hypothesis that in-
dividuals reason according to Iterated Best Reply (IBRd). Our results also
show substantial variation across groups of the proportion of subjects using
diﬀerent levels of reasoning.
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18Table 1: The data of the 6 diﬀerent groups of experiments
Group # of Description of Sample size
experiments subjects ng
1 (Lab) 5 Undergraduate students 86
in labs (Bonn & Caltech)
2 (Class) 2 Undergraduate students, UPF 138
3 (Take-Home) 2 Undergraduate students 119
in Take-Home tasks, UPF
4 (Theorists) 4 Game Theory students 92
and experts in Game Theory
in conferences and e-mail
5 (Internet) 1 Newsgroup in Internet 150
6 (Newspapers ) 3 Readers of FT, E and S 7900
Financial Times 1476
Expansi´ on 3696
Spektrum der Wissenschaft 2728
Table 2: Parameter estimates of the multiple-sample mixture model
components
f0 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6
µk * 35.91 33.35 22.89 14.98 7.35 0.59
σk * 9.37 0.34 2.75 3.19 3.07 1.91
Reasoning levels L-0 L-0 L-1 L-2 L-3 L-inf L-inf
proportions πkg (in % )
Lab 25.88 31.17 6.93 21.70 7.30 5.75 1.27
Classroom 17.56 18.11 14.79 18.57 12.47 9.83 8.67
Take-home 15.52 18.11 7.88 20.39 23.45 8.13 6.53
Theorist 12.93 11.66 3.20 9.49 10.89 19.51 32.31
Internet 13.74 16.36 9.25 15.01 13.77 7.60 24.26
Newspaper 15.31 15.96 8.32 15.35 14.71 14.57 15.78
Column mean 16.82 18.56 8.39 16.75 13.76 10.90 14.80
∗ uniform distribution
Table 3: The % of censoring in each group for the inﬁnity level component
Groups Lab Classroom Take-home Theorist Internet Newspaper
Fitted % 0.75 5.07 3.82 18.90 14.19 9.23
Observed % 1.16 6.52 6.72 25.34 22.00 9.28
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Figure 1: Histogram for the whole sample. The points A,B,C and Inf, cor-
respond to the choices of subjects with ﬁrst, second, third and inﬁnite levels
of reasoning.
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Figure 2: Histograms for the six diﬀerent groups. As in Figure 1, the val-
ues A,B,C and Inf, correspond to ﬁrst, second, third and inﬁnite levels of
reasoning.
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Figure 4: Evolution of the (minus) log-likelihood during iterations of the EM
algorithm
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Figure 5: Components of the mixture distribution
240 20 40 60
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2 Lab       
0 20 40 60
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2 Classroom 
0 20 40 60
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2 Take−home 
0 20 40 60
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2 Theorists 
0 20 40 60
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2 Internet  
0 20 40 60
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2 Newspaper 
Figure 6: Fitted mixture distribution for each group
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